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Introduction
This is a thesis dealing with moral judgment in adoles­
cents. Specifically, the study tests the efficacy of cognitive 
conflict and reinforcement as agents of moral growth in adoles­
cents. The purpose of the investigation is to provide a better 
understanding of the mechanisms responsible for development in 
moral reasoning.
Kohlberg (1958) has presented a systematic theory of 
moral growth in children, adolescents, and adults. He defined 
moral judgment as "the child's use and interpretation of rules 
in conflict situations and his reasons for moral actionsf 
(Kohlberg, 1964, p. 394).* Moral judgment is not correct 
knowledge of rules or conventional belief in them. This general 
definition gives rise to the developmental sequence of moral 
judgment offered by Kohlberg (1958). Specifically, his typology 
consists of three distinct levels, each containing two inter­
related stages.
The first, or premoral level, contains a Punishment 
and Obedience stage and an Instrumental Hedonist stage. The 
first stage represents an individual who has not yet differen­
tiated between himself and others. The person's sole purpose 
is to avoid punishment while using it as a mediator of right 
and wrong. At the second stage, the Instrumental Hedonist 
orientation, an act is judged right if it is satisfying to 
the self and sometimes, but not often, satisfying to others
2instead of the self. Reciprocity does exist at this stage, 
but only in the sense of ’’you scratch my back, and I ’ll 
scratch yours.”
The second level, Conventional Role Conformity, con­
tains the stages of the Good Boy Morality and the Authority 
Maintaining Relationships. Conformity to stereotypic and 
socially accepted norms as well as seeking other’s approval 
acquires importance at the third stage. A person at the Good 
Boy Morality stage judges acts in terms of the intentions 
that precede them. At the fourth stage, Authority Maintaining 
Orientation, the value of people is judged in terms of earned 
expectations. The individual is oriented toward duty and the 
maintenance of the social order for its own sake.
The final level of Self-Accepted Principles is centered 
around autonomous principles of conscience and contains the 
Social Contract and the Principles stages. When one reaches 
the former stage, duty and morality are defined in terms of a 
contract with society. Emphasis is placed upon legality and 
rationality. The sixth and highest stage of moral development 
is the Principles Orientation. An act is judged right if 
premised on self-chosen abstract principles of reciprocity, 
equality of human rights, and a respect for human life and 
people as individuals. A person functioning at the last stage 
often empathizes with persons at lower levels.
Kohlberg’s definition of moral judgment naturally pro­
vokes an important question: ’’What is a moral person?” A
tentative answer to this important question has been offered by
3Kohlberg (1964). People functioning at the lower stages of 
moral judgment development rely on external referents for 
their judgments while the use of internalized principles 
increases as the person matures. When the person becomes 
reliant upon these principles, he is thought to be making 
truly moral judgments. In reference to the nature of these 
moral judgments, Kohlberg (1964) states that, "Moral judg­
ments tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to 
be grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds 
(p. 405)." Therefore, according to Kohlberg's theory, indi­
viduals do make moral judgments when their reasoning about 
right and wrong is independent of immediate external sources 
and resulting conclusions are based upon objective, imper­
sonal, or ideal grounds. However, Kohlberg's conception of 
moral judgment and its development have been challenged by 
other theorists (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Jensen & Larm,
1970; LeFurgy & Woloshin, 1969).
Two major theories have been offered as explanations 
of moral growth: social learning theory (Bandura & McDonald,
1963; Jensen & Larm, 1970; LeFurgy & Woloshin, 1969) and 
cognitive-development theory (Kohlberg, 1953; Piaget, 1932). 
Proponents of the social learning view have stressed the 
importance of the passive internalization of externally pro­
vided behaviors and values. Socialization is important not 
because il provides exact models to imitate, but because indi­
viduals are often able to abstract a common theme from diverse 
situations and consequently generate a principle by which
.4
they produce similar patterns of responses. If reinforced, 
these responses will prevail; otherwise, they are subject to 
extinction. Through generalization based upon conceptual or 
physical similarities between stimuli, these responses occur 
in similar situations and to various socializing agents. In 
sum, this position advocates an initial external view of 
moral development with the strength and internalization of 
moral principles being dependent upon reward, punishment, and 
eventually generalization.
Empirical support for the social learning position has
CU-J,
been provided by Bandura & McDonald (1963) who found that 
observational learning induced modifications in moral judgments.
CLw>|
The Bandura & McDonald study was replicated by Cowan, Danger,
,LA
Heavenrich, & Nathanson (1969). However, unlike the former 
study, the latter included a two-week posttest. Cowan et 
a l . (1969) found that gains induced by observational learning 
were stable across the two-week posttest period.
Social learning theorists not only stress the impor­
tance of early socialization processes, but also emphasize 
later group mechanisms such as peer influence. The importance 
of peer group influence for moral growth was demonstrated in 
a study performed by LeFurgy & Woloshin (1969). Like the 
Cowan ejt al. (1969) study, changes in moral judgment were 
stable across time and generalized to new situations. The 
latter result indicates that change was not a product of a 
specific response set, but a deeper reasoning process.
5Other investigations (Crowley, 1968; Glassco, Milgram,
& Youniss, 1970; Jensen & Larm, 1970) have provided support 
for reinforcement as an effective variable in modifying moral 
judgments. Jensen & Larm (1970) reported that material 
reinforcement can be utilized successfully to condition change 
in moral judgment responses. An important contribution regard­
ing the exact nature of the change produced by reinforcement 
was provided by Glassco e_t _al. (1970). Subjects who had 
experienced changes induced by reinforcement in an earlier 
study (Crowley, 1968) were divided into two groups, one 
received a mixed presentation of moral and nonmoral stories, 
while the other received a block presentation consisting of 
moral stories followed by nonmoral stories. If change was a 
result of the subject focusing on an aspect of moral judgment, 
the authors reasoned that the modifications should generalize 
to moral stories presented in the mixed sequence. Therefore, 
the mixed sequence should re suit in as many or more responses 
indicative of change than the block presentation. However, if 
change was.a result of a specific response set, generalization 
to moral stories presented in a mixed sequence should not occur. 
Altered responses should only occur to moral stories presented 
successively in a block sequence. The results of the Glassco 
study revealed that the mixed sequence produced more modified 
moral judgment responses than the block presentation. There­
fore, the authors concluded that reinforcement alters moral 
judgment rather than a specific response set. Since it appears 
that subjects can be trained to focus on a particular aspect
6of moral judgment, it follows that people who have not focused 
on an aspect of moral judgment might he trained to do so more 
effectively than subjects who have, focused on a particular 
aspect of moral judgment. Hence, the first hypothesis of the 
present study is that subjects who are functioning between 
two stages will change their level of moral judgment more 
than subjects who have reached a particular stage of moral 
judgment.
Unlike the social learning view, some theorists have 
appealed to a cognitive explanation for moral development 
(Kohlberg, 1958; Piaget, 1932). Stages of moral judgment 
have been conceived by these theorists as the result of an 
individual1s .attempt to make sense of his environment. 
Advancement from one stage to the next is a result of both 
the maturing cognitive structures and role-taking experiences.
A mismatch of these two factors induces disequilibrium in the 
cognitive structures which causes the individual to strive for 
a state of equilibrium. To make sense of diverse experiences, 
cognitive structures are revised to deal with subsequent 
situations,. The reduction of dissonance then results- in the 
child's progression to the next stage of moral judgment.
Like the social learning view, the cognitive-development 
position has received strong empirical support (Dworkin, 1969; 
Rest, Tnriel, & Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1971; Smedslund, 1961 
a, b, c, d, e, f; Turiel, 1966). A recent study (Rest et_ 
a l . , 1969) supported two critical assumptions of the cognitive 
approach. First, stages of thinking above the subject's
7predominant stage are preferred to thinking he low his stage; 
second, modes of thought above are more difficult to compre­
hend than those below his modal stage. According to these 
results, the authors proposed that a child comprehends before 
he assimilates material, and assimilates advice before he uses 
it spontaneously. Therefore, a'child’s ability to move u p ­
ward depends upon his cognitive maturity and the amount of 
time that he has functioned at that level. The modest 
correlations of .31 to .5# between I.Q. and moral judgment 
reported by Boehm (1962), Cudrin (1962), Johnson (1959), 
and Stuart (1967) offer additional empirical support for 
the cognitive view of moral development since intelligence 
has been viewed as directly related to cognitive development.
The function of role-taking ability as a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for change in moral reasoning 
has been supported by Selman (1971). However, a more detailed 
study of the interaction of roles and moral judgment change 
was provided by Turiel (1966). Specifically, roles which 
produced conflict in the subject were utilized. The results 
indicated that conflicting reasoning one stage above the 
child’s predominant stage induced the most change in moral 
judgments, as opposed to reasoning two stages above, or one 
stage be low the child’s modal stage. However, since situations 
utilized in the posttest were' also utilized in the pretest, 
it is difficult to assert that modifications in moral judgment 
generalized to new situations. The possibility exists that
8tests may have measured changes in situationally-specific 
responses, rather than moral reasoning.
A well designed study by Keasey (1971) attempted to 
modify moral opinions (i.e., responses to specific situations 
which do not generalize to subsequent stories from Kohlberg's 
Moral Judgment Interview) and to advance moral reasoning 
utilizing three conditions of reasoning: opinion with no
supportive reasoning; opinion with supportive reasoning at 
the person's predominant stage; and opinion with supportive 
reasoning one step above the subject's dominant stage. Half 
of each treatment group received a one-sided presentation 
which consisted of an opinion contrary to the subject's view, 
while the other half was exposed to two opinions, both con­
trary to the subject's viewpoint. Moral opinion was measured 
by repeat items used during both the training and posttest, 
while moral reasoning was measured by new items. All three 
treatment conditions produced significantly greater gains in 
moral reasoning than the control condition. Also, one-sided 
presentations produced significantly greater changes in moral 
opinion than two-sided presentations. The experiment supports 
one-sided reasoning as an agent of alteration in moral opinion, 
while it does not support the contention that diverse levels 
of reasoning differentially affect the subject's moral reason­
ing. Besides providing evidence for the cognitive orientation, 
Keasey's study stresses the importance of distinguishing 
between moral opinion and reasoning in studies of moral develop­
ment .
9Although hoth cognitive conflict and social learning 
have received support as agents of change in moral judgment, 
few investigations have compared them. Smedslund (1961 a, b, 
c, d, e, f) attempted the induction of conservation, a cognitive 
concept which refers to the ability to comprehend that an 
object stays the same while its shape, volume, or mass is 
varied. Various reinforcement and cognitive conflict treat­
ments were utilized. It was concluded that cognitive conflict 
was the only way to induce a permanent understanding of conser­
vation. Dworkin (1971) investigated change in moral judgment 
by comparing the effectiveness of observational learning and a 
cognitive information task. . Like Smedslund, only the cognitive 
information task induced modifications that generalized to new 
situations. The results of these studies (Dworkin, 1971; 
Smedslund, 1961 a, b, c, d, e, f) provide evidence for the 
cognitive position and the efficacy of cognitive conflict for 
producing generalizable changes in moral judgment. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis of the present study is that cognitive 
conflict will induce more generalizable changes in moral judg­
ment than a reinforcement procedure.
There have been no studies which have compared the 
efficacy of cognitive conflict and reinforcement for changing 
transitional stage subjects, people functioning between stages, 
and dominant stage subjects, those who have focused on a stage 
of moral judgment. However, since transitional stage subjects 
have not focused on any one stage of moral judgment, it follows 
that they may be more susceptible to change when offered an
10
incentive to do so than dominant stage subjects. Therefore, 
reinforcement should induce more change in transitional than 
dominant stage subjects. However, there is little reason to 
predict that cognitive conflict would affect the two levels 
differently. According to Kohlberg (1958), only, maturity 
of cognitive structures produces the capacity to advance. Since
there is no evidence which leads one to assume that cognitive 
structures are more mature in transitional subjects than domi­
nant stage subjects, role-taking situations offer equal 
opportunities to advance for both level subjects. Consequently, 
the third and fourth hypotheses are; reinforcement will 
cause greater generalizable change in transitional than domi­
nant stage subjects, and change in transitional stage subjects 
will be greater in the reinforcement condition than in the 
cognitive conflict situation.
The purpose of the present study was to compare the 
efficacy of reinforcement and cognitive conflict to induce 
modifications in moral judgment. Specifically, the hypotheses 
which this study was designed to test were: (l) more gener­
alizable change in moral judgment will be experienced by 
transitional than dominant stage subjects, (2) cognitive 
conflict will produce more generalizable change in moral 
judgment than reinforcement, (3) reinforcement will cause 
greater generalizable change in transitional than dominant 
stage subjects, and (4) change in transitional stage subjects 
will be greater in the reinforcement condition than in the 
cognitive conflict situation.
11
Me thod
Sub je cts
The subjects consisted of 15 boys and 15 girls drawn 
from the ninth grade at Bishop Ryan High School, a Catholic 
school in Omaha, Nebraska. Subjects were selected for 
participation in the experiment according to their performance 
on a pretest of moral judgment. All subjects were between 
the ages of 13 and 15 years, and the majority were from the 
lower middle class.
Equipment
Eight hypothetical conflict situations (1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, & 8.) and corresponding probe questions from
Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview were used to assess the 
subject's stage of moral judgment. A portable tape recorder 
was used to record responses which were scored according to 
Kohlberg's Global Rating Guide. Poker chips associated with 
peace decals and 45 R. P. M. records were used as reinforcers. 
During t h e 'interviews, subjects and the experimenter were 
seated in a small room to insure privacy.
De s ign
A repeated measures design was employed to assess 
changes in moral judgment as a function of training. Spe­
cifically, two experimental procedures, a cognitive conflict 
and a reinforcement treatment, were employed for the purpose 
of advancing moral judgment. In addition, a control condition
12
was used to compare natural developmental advances with 
possible changes induced in moral development by training. 
Accordingly, the two experimental groups received a pretest 
and posttest of moral judgment with an interpolated training 
procedure (i.e., three 30 minute sessions), while the control 
group received the pretest and posttest with an interpolated 
neutral activity of the same duration as the training sessions.
Pre-Experimental Procedure
An attempt was made to match each set of situations 
administered on the pretest, training phase, and posttest 
according to three underlying situational dimensions. Accord- 
ingly, 32 undergraduate and graduate students from the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha categorized the eight situa­
tions in terms of one or more of the following dimensions: 
sacrifice, worth of human life, and loyalty. The agreement 
for assigning any one dimension to any one situation ranged
/ 0
from 40 to 84 percent. To insure that the three parts of 
the study were measuring the same underlying dimensions, items 
were utilized in each phase of the investigation which had 
been similarly categorized.
To determine the initial stage of functioning, four 
conflict situations (1, 2, 4, & 6) from Kohlberg's interview
were used. The protocols were transcribed and scored according 
to Kohlberg's Global Rating Guide. The subjects were differ­
entiated into dominant and transitional categories which 
enabled an.assessment of the relationship between moral
13
judgment change and these levels. To fulfill this requirement, 
a sample of 55 subjects was required to identify the necessary 
15 dominant and 15 transitional stage subjects. A dominant 
stage was assigned if at least 75 percent of the subject's 
total responses were from the same stage of moral judgment.
A transitional stage was assigned if the subject produced 
more than 50 percent of his total responses at a particular 
stage and at least 25 percent of his responses at a different
level. Each of the subjects was assigned to one of three
 ^■
groups which were matched for stage of moral judgment, Differ­
ential Aptitude Test score, and sex. Subjects were included 
in the experiment who manifested predominantly stage two and 
three moral judgment responses.
Experimental Procedure
The two treatment procedures used to change moral 
judgment were complete or partial replications of techniques 
used in three prior studies (Bandura & McDonald, 1963;
Jensen & Larm, 1970; Turiel, 1966).
Operant conditioning. The purpose of this procedure 
was to condition the subject to emit responses one step above 
his initial stage of moral functioning. The subject was 
exposed to four of Kohlberg's conflict situations, two of 
which were new situations (3 & 5) and two of which had been
used on the pretest (1 & 6). After each story, a discussion
of the subject's responses was initiated.
uSince it was anticipated that a low operant rate of 
responses one stage above a child’s dominant stage would be 
encountered, a shaping procedure was employed. Responses 
which successively approximated the reasoning characteristic 
of the appropriate stage were reinforced until a total of 35 
reinforcements had been dispensed. The experimenter adminis­
tered social reinforcers such as: ’’right,” ’’correct," and
"good" as well as material reinforcers. In the latter case, 
tokens were associated with peace decals and <45 R. P. M. 
records. Initially, the CRF schedule of reinforcement was 
employed. The schedule was changed to a one-to-two schedule 
when subjects emitted five consecutive responses at a stage 
of moral judgment one step above his initial level. An 
additional shift was made to a one-to-three schedule when 
the identical criterion was reached a second time. A maximum 
of 15 tokens per experimental session was administered.
The instructions were as follows: ”Hi, I ’m Jim Doornink.
I ’ve asked you to come because I ’m doing an experiment for 
my master’s thesis, and I would like you to participate.- 
I ’m going to read four stories to you successively. After 
each story, I ’ll ask some questions. If you respond with the 
answers that I want, I ’ll reward you with these tokens. If 
you get 10 tokens, you may choose a decal; but if you get 15, 
you may choose one of these records. I ’m going to record your 
voice because I cannot write fast enough to get your responses.
Do you have any questions?"
15
Cognitive conflict. The purpose of this procedure 
was to induce change in moral judgment by placing the subject 
in a state of cognitive conflict with the use of moral rea­
soning one step above his dominant stage. This was accom­
plished by exposing the subject to four of Kohlberg’s 
hypothetical situations, two of which were new situations 
(3 & 4.) and two of which had been used on the pretest phase
of the study (1 & 6 ). The subject was asked to play the
role of the main character in the story, while the experimenter 
played the roles of two apparent friends of the subject. Each 
apparent friend offered solicited advice to the subject. Rea­
soning from Kohlberg’s Aspe ct Scoring Manual was oriented 
toward contrary opinions one stage above the child’s initial 
level of functioning.
Presumably, presenting conflicting moral reasoning to 
the subjects caused cognitive conflict in the child. In this 
connection, Rest et a1. (1969) found support for the notion
that subjects prefer moral reasoning one stage above their 
current level of functioning. Therefore, exposing a subject 
to conflicting reasoning one stage above his own should cause 
some accommodation to the discrepant information through the 
reduction of cognitive dissonance.
The instructions were as follows: ”Hi, I ’m Jim
Doornink. I ’ve asked you to come because I ’m doing an experi­
ment for my master’s thesis, and I would like you lo participate. 
I ’m going to read four stories to you successively. 1 would 
like you to play the main character of each story, and I will
16
play the role of two of your friends. Could you give me the 
names of two of your close friends? After each story, I'll 
ask you some questions. Before you answer, I would like you
to ask __________________ and then   to give you
advice. After the advice has been given, you may give your 
answer, and we will discuss it. Do you have any questions?”
Control. The subjects in the control group were seen 
in three one-half hour sessions, as were the subjects in the 
two experimental conditions. The explanation given for the 
necessity of the experiment was that the experimenter wanted 
to observe the subject's study habits and the type of material 
being studied.
Post-Experimental Procedure
Two weeks following the interpolated experience, the 
subjects were interviewed using four of Kohlberg's conflict 
situations to determine the effect of the two procedures on 
the moral judgment level of the child. While two of the four 
situations (1 & 6) had been utilized on the pretest and
training phases of the study, a test of generalization was 
provided by two new situations (7 & 8). One day after the
posttest, the experimenter assembled the subjects to explain 
the study and answer questions.
Scoring and Reliability of Protocols
All protocols were scored blind and assigned moral 
judgment quotients (MJQ's). The use of dominant and 'transi­
tional stages was expressed as a percentage of the total
17
number of scored responses. From these percentages, a moral 
age or MJQ was computed. For example, a subject whose test 
pattern illustrated 65 percent stage two responses, 30 percent 
stage three responses, and 5 percent stage four responses would 
receive a moral age of 65 x 2 + 30 x 3 + 5 x 4 or 240. The 
protocols were scored situation-by-situation rather than 
subject-by-subject to produce maximum scoring accuracy. One 
estimate of scoring reliability was obtained using eight 
protocols rated independently by two scorers. A reliability 
coefficient of .87 was obtained between raters.
Re suits
Change in moral age scores from pretest to posttest
was the dependent measure. Scores were analyzed by two
separate 3 (treatment) x 2 (transitional, dominant) x 
2 (pretest, posttest) repeated measures analyses of variance.
One analysis was performed on repeated items to determine 
changes in situation-specific moral responses. Another 
analysis was computed on nonrepeated items to test for gener­
alization of change in moral judgment.
Repeat Item Analysis
The analysis of variance on the repeat items revealed 
three significant main effects: treatments (F=4.20, df=2/24,
p ^ .05), transition versus dominant stages (F=7.64, df=l/24, 
P <  .025 ), and pre te st-postte st (F = 13.41, df = l/24, p .01).
However, these significant factors yield little information
IS
about the effectiveness of the treatments because only inter­
actions with pretest-posttest indicate changes in moral 
judgment induced by training.
A significant Treatment x' Pretest-Posttest interaction, 
represented graphically in Figure 1 (F=4*14, df=2/24, -05),
indicates that the training procedures did cause change in 
moral age scores. A simple main effects analysis revealed 
that significant changes in moral age were produced by the 
cognitive conflict (F=26.19, df=l/24, p .05) and reinforce­
ment treatments (F=9.4, df=l/24, p ^..05). No significant 
pretest-posttest differences were found for the control group. 
All other effects for the repeat item analysis were non­
significant .
Despite the fact that differences between groups on 
the pretest were small, close inspection of Figure 1 reveals 
discrepancies which may have affected subsequent posttest 
scores. Consequently, to obtain a better test of treatment 
effectiveness, a t_-test was performed utilizing difference 
scores between pretest and posttest for the reinforcement 
and cognitive conflict conditions (t=1.38, df=l8, p ^ - , 10).
The test which approaches significance indicates that the 
cognitive conflict technique, as presented in this study, 
may have been a more powerful agent of change in moral age 
with respect to repeat items than the reinforcement procedure.
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Nonrepeat Item Analysis
Figure 2 represents graphically the relationship 
between treatment means across pretest and posttest. A 
similar pattern of increase was found for the cognitive 
conflict and control conditions, although the change was non­
significant. However, the subjects receiving the reinforce­
ment condition actually regressed slightly.
No significant main effects or interactions were 
found in the analysis of nonrepeat items; however, it was 
hypothesized that the cognitive conflict technique would 
produce more generalizable changes than the reinforcement 
condition. According to Winer (1962, p. 208), ’’The specific 
comparisons which are built into the design or suggested by 
the theoretical basis for the experiment can and should be 
made individually regardless of the outcome of the corresponding 
overail test.” Therefore, three individual F tests were 
performed on the treatment totals across pretest and posttest.
No significant differences were found for the three conditions. 
Consequently, the hypothesis predicting that cognitive conflict 
would produce more generalizable changes in moral judgment 
than reinforcement was not supported.
Since no significant interaction was found for dominant 
and transitional stages across the pretest and posttest, it 
appears that dominant and transitional stage subjects did not 
change differentially. Also, no significant interaction of 
treatments by dominant and transitional stages occurred which
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indicates that the individual treatments did not substantially 
affect dominant and transitional stage subjects differently.
Discuss ion
The results of the study show a pattern of change 
somewhat different than predicted. In contrast to previous 
studies (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Cowan et al., 1969; Crowley, 
1968; Glassco, Milgram, & Youniss, 1970; Jensen & Larm, 1970; 
Keasey, 1971; LeFurgy & Woloshin, 1969), truly generalizable 
modifications in moral judgment were not found. Cognitive 
conflict and reinforcement did produce significant changes in 
moral age, but these modifications did not generalize to new 
situations; consequently they represent short-lived changes 
in moral judgment. These results seem best interpreted by 
an'appeal to Keasey1s (1971) distinction between moral reason­
ing and moral opinion. Alteration in moral opinion was 
operationally defined by Keasey as the percentage of gains in 
moral judgment quotient between training and posttest on 
stories used in both phases of the study, while variation in 
moral reasoning was the difference score from pretest to post­
test utilizing new stories. Therefore, since gains in moral 
age were found only on items used during pretest, training, 
and posttest, the present study appears to have changed the 
subject’s moral opinion rather than moral reasoning.
At least two explanations may be offered for the failure 
of the cognitive conflict procedure to produce generalized
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changes in moral judgment. If subjects had just progressed 
into their pretest state of moral judgment, it is unlikely 
that they would be mature enough to advance to. the next stage. 
However, transitional reasoning, as the pretest measure, was 
not more common below the predominant stages than above, 
indicating that subjects had functioned at their dominant 
stage for a period of time.
The second explanation deals with the effectiveness 
of the treatment. The cognitive conflict procedure may not 
have been strong enough to produce disequilibrium in the 
subjects. However, during the training phase of the study, 
subjects exposed to the cognitive conflict procedure appeared 
to the experimenter to exhibit more excitement, nervousness, 
and remarked about the difficulty of the probing questions 
than subjects receiving the reinforcement condition. There­
fore, it appears that the cognitive conflict treatment was 
strong enough to produce dissonance within the child. However, 
the cognitive conflict treatment might not have produced 
dissonance of adequate intensity to induce generalizable 
cognitive change thus indicating a need for more powerful 
tre atment s .
Since moral opinion was altered utilizing the present 
procedure, it is conceivable that a more effective cognitive 
conflict treatment could cause advancement in moral reasoning. 
Several improvements in the present cognitive conflict pro­
cedure could be instituted. Real friends, rather than the
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experimenter playing their roles, would create a more life­
like situation. Also, a one-sided presentation was found to 
he more credible by Keasey’s '(1971) subjects indicating that 
it may be a stronger agent of change than a two-sided presen­
tation. Therefore, one friend offering moral reasoning 
contrary to the subject’s reasoning, but one stage above his 
initial level of moral judgment, should be more effective.
The failure of the operant conditioning technique to 
induce generalizable change in moral reasoning can be accounted 
for best by a temporary conformity effect. The subject may 
have conformed to obtain reinforcements while failing to 
comprehend the reasoning implicit in the responses for which 
they were reinforced. Thus, when new situations were offered, 
the subject utilized his initial reasoning to derive responses. 
However, on repeat items the situationally-specific response 
set which was developed may have been maintained to please 
the experimenter.
To provide a more effective reinforcement treatment, 
subjects could be presented with the actual prizes, rather 
than tokens associated with them, since a more immediate 
reinforcement effect would result. In addition, modeling 
(Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Cowan e_t _al. , 1969) would convey 
to the subject the behavior desired. Perhaps a combination 
of reinforcement and modeling processes would result in a 
more effective operant procedure.
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The distinction "between dominant and transitional 
stage subjects did not produce the differential change pre­
dicted for these levels. Two reasons are offered for the 
failure of dominant and transitional subjects to change 
differentially. First, the present experiment did not ade­
quately distinguish between transitional and dominant stage 
subjects. To obtain more information about differential 
training effects in relation to dominant and transitional 
stage subjects, the Aspe ct Scor ing Manual might be implemented. 
Unlike the global scoring method, the more sensitive aspect 
scoring system provides information about variation in the 
different aspects of moral judgment. Use of this instrument 
would allow more delineated changes produced by the treatments. 
However, adequate reliability is difficult to obtain utilizing 
the aspect method, as some studies have shown (Keasey, 1971; 
Turiel, 1966).
The second reason deals with the possibility that the 
reinforcement and cognitive conflict treatments may not affect 
dominant and transitional stage subjects differently. However,, 
due to the lack of a sharper delineation between the two 
categories and insufficient time for application of treatments, 
this question must be answered by future research.
The importance of this investigation is related to its 
methodological implications. Transformation of a deep-seated 
cognitive structure can only be assessed by irreversibility in 
the face of training (Kohlberg, 1964; Smedslund, 1961 f;
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Turiel, 1966) and generalization to new situations (Keasey, 
1971; Kohlberg, 1964). Turiel (1966) did not test for 
generalizability, as all posttest items had previously been 
seen by the subjects, which makes it difficult to assert 
conclusively that moral reasoning, rather than moral opinion, 
was changed. Other investigations (Dworkin, 1969; Keasey, 
1971; LeFurgy & Woloshin,.1969) have provided tests of 
generalizability which support the contention that moral 
reasoning can be modified by short-term training. In light 
of the present results, however, it might be concluded that 
generalizable change in moral judgment may be a more difficult 
task than previously asserted.
In summary, it can be concluded that situationally- 
specific moral opinions were modified by means of cognitive 
conflict and reinforcement procedures. These changes did not 
generalize to new situations, indicating that they were short­
term in nature. Therefore, it appears that moral opinion and 
not moral reasoning was altered by the present treatment con­
ditions. Since the difference between treatments approached 
significance, the cognitive conflict treatment might have been 
a more effective facilitator of short-term change than the 
reinforceme’nt procedure. No differential treatment effect was 
evident for transitional and dominant stage subjects.
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Table l
Analysis of Variance: Repeat Items
Source df MS F
Treatments (A) 2 4941-716 4.2 0*
Transition (B) 
Dominant 1 8808.816 7.64**
Pretest- (C) 
Posttest 1 15456.150 13-41***
Error Between 
Ss 24 1152.733
A x B 2 309.316 .57
A x C 2 2257.850 4 -14*
B x C 1 464-816 . 85
A x B x C 2 2 85.716 -53
Error Within 
Ss 24 544.26
* p <  . 05
** p <  . 025
*•** p < . 01
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance Nonrepeat Items
Source df MS F
Treatments (A) 2 651.516 .56
Transition (B) 
Dominant 1 2893.150 2.49
Prete st- (C ) 
Postte st 1 1016.816 . 88
Error Between 
Ss 2 4 1159.325
A x B 2 877.85 0 1. 65
A x C 2 627.816 1.18
B x C 1 814.016 1.53
A x B x C 2 296.216 .56
Error Within 
Ss 2 4 5 30.941
* p ^  . 05
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